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FRAM for systemic accident analysis:  




Due to the inherent complexity of nowadays Air Traffic Management (ATM) system, standard methods looking at 
an event as a linear sequence of failures might become inappropriate. For this purpose, adopting a systemic 
perspective, the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) originally developed by Hollnagel, helps 
identifying non-linear combinations of events and interrelationships.  
This paper aims to enhance the strength of FRAM-based accident analyses, discussing the Resilience Analysis 
Matrix (RAM), a user-friendly tool that supports the analyst during the analysis, in order to reduce the complexity 
of representation of FRAM. The RAM offers a two dimensional representation which highlights systematically 
connections among couplings, and thus even highly connected group of couplings. As an illustrative case study, 
this paper develops a systemic accident analysis for the runway incursion happened in February 1991 at LAX 
airport, involving SkyWest Flight 5569 and USAir Flight 1493. FRAM confirms itself a powerful method to 
characterize the variability of the operational scenario, identifying the dynamic couplings with a critical role 
during the event and helping discussing the systemic effects of variability at different level of analysis. 
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Accident analysis; FRAM; air traffic control; air traffic management; safety; resilience engineering; runway 
incursion; socio-technical system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The traditional definition of safety as “a condition where nothing goes wrong or where the number of things that 
go wrong is acceptably small” has been widely adopted over years 1. This definition, linked with the naturalness of 
linear thinking and the subsequent cause-effect relationship led to a well-established safety strategy: decomposing 
the system and describing it using as many details as possible to detect the causes and develop strategies to remove 
them or at least to minimize their effects. However, this perspective appeared to be progressively inaccurate to 
describe and analyze modern socio-technical systems. The causality credo and a linear cause-effect reasoning no 
longer represent universally valuable concepts. In particular, the complexity of current ATM system does not allow 
relying on individual reliability analysis, based on a bimodal nature of work, i.e. functioning and not functioning. 
System decomposability is often hardly possible to acquire, due to inherent flaws of decomposing tight-coupled 
functions. Systemic approaches become thus necessary, acknowledging the relevance of understanding the 
inherent complexity rather than simplifying it. In terms of safety analyses, rather than focusing only on adverse 
outcomes and trying to delve into the causes of system malfunctioning, it becomes necessary to understand system 
normal functioning. In line with this perspective, safety can be defined as “the ability to succeed under varying 
conditions, so that the number of intended and acceptable outcomes is as high as possible”. This definition, in line 
with the Resilience Engineering theory, acquires a relevant role for the ATM systems, which are characterized by 
a large number of interacting human, organizational, technical aspects. 
Furthermore, as shown by recent tendency in airport operations, by 2030 19 European important airports - among 
which will be Paris Charles De Gaulle, Warsaw, Athens, Wien, and Barcelona – will come to saturation. This 
congestion, combined with the tight-coupled nature of work at different human, technical and organization levels 
might generate losses both in terms of productivity, i.e. delays in operations, and expectable safety-related 
consequences 2,3.  
Following a more theoretical approach, it becomes necessary to look at safety, generally based on the so-called 
Safety-I perspective, also in terms of Safety-II. Safety-I relies on the following assumptions 4: 
- Systems are decomposable and well-understood 
- Systems and places of work are well-designed and correctly maintained 
- Procedures are comprehensive, complete and correct 
- Operators behave as they are expected to and as they have been trained to 
- Designers have foreseen every contingency and have provided the system with appropriate response 
capabilities. 
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On the contrary, for Safety-II: 
- Systems cannot be decomposed in a meaningful way 
- System functions are not bimodal but everyday performance is flexible and variable 
- Human performance variability leads to success as well as failures 
- Even though some outcome can be interpreted as linear consequences of other events, some event result 
of coupled performance variability. 
Based on these assumptions, for reliable risk assessment and accident analyses, it becomes thus necessary to 
follow a systemic perspective, in line with Safety-II and Resilience Engineering. A reliable systemic accident 
analysis should go beyond advocating a human error as a cause, in order to understand non-linear functional 
effects of variability among agents in everyday operations. This perspective would allow focusing not only on 
individual failures, but also on systemic failures, acknowledging that accident might be the result of normal work 
in normal circumstances. Furthermore, the deviation (work-as-done) from the prescribed work (work-as-
imagined) might cause both positive and negative effects. Deviations have to be considered in agreement with the 
concept of local rationality, since in some circumstances, they become unavoidable and even necessary to deal 
with the complexity of the current scenario. 
Following an operational perspective, the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) developed by Hollnagel 
1, offers a systemic perspective both for accident analysis and risk assessment, acknowledging the role of 
performance variability and inherent complexity.  
This paper aims to discuss the role of FRAM for accident analysis, showing its benefits to describe the work-as-
done in complex systems. Furthermore, considering the inherent limitation due to the FRAM’s overwhelming 
complexity of representation, we developed a simple and user-friendly tool, i.e. the Resilience Analysis Matrix 
(RAM), enhancing a recently proposed approach 5. The target of RAM consists of generating systematic 
assessments based on FRAM’s systemic perspective, being a support tool for the traditional FRAM, in order to gain 
findings and ease a structured analysis of the system. The proposed structure of RAM enhances a traditional FRAM 
approach, offering detailed insights, even in combination with recent semi-quantitative evolutions of FRAM. This 
paper innovatively presents a detailed application of RAM in case of accident analysis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes relevant applications of FRAM in literature, 
with particular reference to accident analysis. Section 3 details the principles and building steps of an accident 
analysis based on FRAM, developing the theoretical foundation of RAM and discussing its potential benefits. 
Section 4 contextualizes these theoretical assumptions in the ATM system, with particular reference to runway 
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incursions. Furthermore, Section 4 details an illustrative case study, based on the LAX airport accident, and 
happened the February 1, 1991. The conclusion finally summarizes the good outcomes of the method and potential 
paths for future research. 
2. Evidence from literature 
The FRAM aims to model complex systems looking at their functional aspects rather than their physical structure, 
defining dynamic interactions among functions and modelling performance variability, which represents the 
source for both failures and successes. The FRAM allows thus a systemic representation of the system, in order to 
assess how variability might propagate through the system, potentially generating emerging risks.  
When used for risk assessment, the FRAM aims at understanding how performance variability might affect other 
upstream and downstream functions, encouraging thoughts about how a potentially disruptive performance 
variability can be detected and monitored, or more classically dampened. For event investigation, the functional 
representation of the system is explored to understand how the an accident happened, and identify ways to 
manage performance variability more properly 1. 
Even though the FRAM is a quite recent method, it has been applied in different domains over years, (e.g.) for 
interpreting experimental results obtained from a railway simulator 6, or to assess risks for nuclear power plants 7 and 
process plants 8. In the healthcare domain, FRAM has been applied to manage emerging risks emerging as a 
combination of human, organizational and technical variability within an emergency care pathway 9, or for 
implementing clinical guidelines 10, and for describing work-as-done in terms of system’s resilience, in a case study 
about blood sampling activities 11. 
However, its first applications were in the aviation and the air traffic control: in 2007 a case study evaluated the 
effects of automation for the pilot cabin in order to understand system functioning in terms of deviations from 
operating procedures 12, in relation to the flight 965 in Colombia happened in 1995. A FRAM-based accident 
analysis also lead to investigate the Alaska Airlines flight 261 crash into the Pacific Ocean, happened in 2000 13. 
Studying the same accident, FRAM has been acknowledged to address five key characteristics, i.e. buffering 
capacity, flexibility, margin, tolerance, and cross-scale interactions 14.  Another accident analysis based on FRAM 
was related to the MD83 F-GRMC approaching Paris Orly airport in the 1997, which proved the relevance of 
functional resonance in terms of allowing an in-depth characterization of the evolving operating circumstances 15. 
FRAM has been compared to traditional accident investigation also in the context of Comair flight 5191 of 2006, 
stating that the conclusions of the NTSB fall somewhat short of the mark addressing the crew error as a primary 
cause 16. The application unveiled complex interrelationships that would help defining appropriate 
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countermeasures based on management performance variability rather than on simply constraining it. Similar 
outcomes arose from the mid-air collision between the B737-800 N600XL and an executive jet Embraer E-145, 
occurred in 2006 in the Amazonian sky 17. 
As a method, it has been compared to STEP in order to analyze the B737-36N NAX541 from Stavanger Sola airport 
to Oslo Gardermoen airport 18. The analysis highlighted the relevance of FRAM to understand variability moving 
the analysis into the conditions of normal work, beyond the specifics of the time sequence and failure. Similar 
results emerged when comparing FRAM with fault tree analysis in an offshore operation accident: a system 
perspective unveils hidden factors leading to a comprehensive understanding of the accident itself 19. It has been 
also confirmed 20 that FRAM has the potential to enrich hazard identification as a complementary tool, combined 
with Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), as emerged in a pilot study in the maritime domain.  
Starting from incident data and normal operations, FRAM has been applied to define safety performance indicators 
for helicopter offshore 21. In the study, the analysis of normal functioning and incident data was combined with 
interviews of different agents, i.e. helicopter pilots, ATCOs, helicopter deck operators and regulators. In addition, 
FRAM has been combined with different method and approaches, in order to overcome some limitations of the 
method itself. For example, it has been combined with HAMSTERS (Human-centered Assessment and Modelling 
to Support Task Engineering for Resilient System) and ICO (Interactive Cooperative Objects) to investigate the 
effects of automation in the ATM system 22.  
The FRAM has been also discussed in a semi-quantitative perspective, adopting Monte Carlo simulation to quantify 
the variability of couplings, showing a conceptual application for analyzing runway incursions 23, industrial plant 
environmental risks 24, or even emergent risks in space operations 25. A model-checking-aided FRAM has also been 
developed to explore all the couplings among system functions and subsequently, to pinpoint critical sources of 
variability in everyday operations 26. These approaches aim at developing more understandable results, rather 
than simply reducing the work-domain’s complexity, isolating respectively critical paths and critical iterations of 
the model. Recent trends in the application of FRAM result thus in developing wider models, taking advantage of 
the systemic perspective of the method itself. However, in these cases the represented model are complicated and 
consequently present severe limitations in terms of comprehensibility of the results, due to their inherent highly 
interconnected structure 5.  
For this purpose, this paper shows the application of FRAM in case of an accident analysis in the aviation context, 
developing a FRAM model based on historic data and evaluations by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). Besides the 
traditional four steps, starting from a recently proposed framework 5, this paper suggests an enhanced 
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representation of the system states, i.e. a matrix representation: the Resilience Analysis Matrix (RAM), an user-
friendly representation that allows systematic analysis even for the more complicated FRAM models. A detail 
application of the RAM will show how to apply it in practice, following the building steps of the FRAM, according 
to a theoretical perspective and a detailed case study. 
3. Principles and building steps of FRAM 
FRAM relies on four principles 1:  
- Equivalence of successes and failures: Successes and failures have the same origin, i.e. performance 
variability. In this sense, the FRAM is in line with Resilience Engineering perspective on failures. More 
specifically, it is possible to experience a failure due to the difficulties arising from adapting the system 
functioning to cope with real world, rather than consider failures as normal events on the system. 
- Approximate adjustments: People as individuals or as a group and organizations adjust their everyday 
performance to cope with everyday operating conditions, resources and requirements. Due to resources 
finiteness, such adjustments appear to be approximate rather than exact. 
- Emergence: Identifying a specific event (or a linear chain of events) as a cause of a system failure is a 
difficult, even impossible, task. Many events appear to be emergent rather than resultant from a specific 
combination of conditions, since the causal relationship is not always detectable. 
- Functional Resonance: The functional resonance represents the detectable signal emerging from the 
unintended interaction of the everyday variability of multiple signals. This variability is not random but 
related to human, organizational and technical behaviors. The functional resonance is a dynamic 
phenomenon, depending on system and environmental conditions. 
Based on these principles, safety assessment should go beyond traditional measures relying on the number of 
failures: things that go wrong (accidents and incidents) and things that go right (normal work) both arise from 
performance variability. Determining the safety level of a system consists thus of measuring the presence of 
acceptable outcomes: (obviously) the more, the safer. For risk assessment purpose, the FRAM can help identifying 
proper leading indicators for system safety (e.g. in the aviation domain 21: airworthy in terms of maintenance 
performance and vibration health monitoring; quality of communication; procedures quality by audits and 
observations, etc.). This perspective is in line with the principle of approximate adjustments, in the sense that a 
system can be advocated as robustly safe if it has the capability of adjusting its functioning to deal with both 
expected and unexpected working conditions. On the contrary, a system failure is the result of an unintended 
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interaction of multiple signals, arising from normal performance variability and leading to disproportionately 
large effects arising from small or even insignificant variations.  
The next sections (§3.1 – 3.4) summarize the FRAM’s four fundamental building steps, taking into account the 
innovative formulation of RAM, for the purpose of accident analysis.  
3.1 Step 1: Identification and description of system’s functions 
Based on system knowledge and through the analysis of processes and tasks, available procedures, historic data, 
and/or involving SMEs, it is possible to characterize the system by its functional structure. In the FRAM, a function 
is made up of six aspects: 
- Input (I): what starts the function or what is processed or transformed by the function. 
- Output (O): the result of the function, either an entity or a state change, used as input to the downstream 
functions. 
- Precondition (P): mandatory conditions that must exist before carrying out the function, not necessarily 
implying the function execution.  
- Resource (R): what the function needs when it is carried out or consumes to produce the output.  
- Control (C): function monitoring and controlling, regulating its performance to match the desired Output. 
- Time (T): temporal constraints affecting the function, with regard to both duration and time of execution. 
3.2 Step 2: Identification of performance variability 
Since performance variability has a crucial role in everyday work, it is necessary to identify how each system 
function varies. Differently from risk assessment, in an accident analysis it is possible to define the actual 
variability during the accident itself. In this case, it is possible to define the variability in terms of phenotypes of 
variability, (e.g.) timing, precision, direction, speed, object, force 1, with specific identification of the variability 
state. This variability represents a key to understand systematically the deviations from normal work and by the 
aid of FRAM Step 3 (see § 3.3), the propagation of these deviations within the system. 
3.3 Step 3: Aggregation of variability – the role of RAM 
This step aims to develop an overall description of the actual links and couplings among functions, related to the 
accident. This description highlights how variability propagates through the system, generating functional 
resonance or damping. Currently, the analysis requires the analyst to deal with variability, link by link, following 
the visual representation of FRAM functions. However, as discussed in recent literature for a risk assessment 
scenario, this standard analysis has some limitations in terms of comprehensibility of a complex scenario, which 
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generates a complicated FRAM model, visually overloaded, i.e. including a great number of highly interconnected 
functions 27.  
In terms of aggregation of variability, the RAM presented in this paper, serves as a support tool to help visualizing 
functional interdependencies. A functional interdependence is a relationship that exists between two aspects so 
that an upstream aspect influences a different downstream aspect in a specific way, i.e. as Input, Precondition, 
Control, Resource or Time. Defining the functional interdependencies in a work domain is not an algorithmic 
process but rather it is a gradual development of the understanding process of the specific event under analysis, 
because of mutual understanding among the SMEs and the analysts involved in the analysis. 
The matrix is constructed listing on the rows and on the columns the n couplings of the model; therefore it is an n 
x n square matrix. By the term “coupling”, we intend each type of output-input link, i.e. not only O-I but also O-P, 
O-C, O-R, O-T. As a difference from a previously presented matrix based on FRAM 5, note that here we list the 
couplings rather than the functions. This choice represents a solution to highlight the relevance of studying 
components interactions rather than individual functions: the RAM we proposed relates couplings, with no need 
to detail the description of the aspects in each matrix’ element, but rather allowing a more readable analysis in line 
with the principles of Safety-II.  The element RAMij assumes values 1 or 0: if the coupling i is linked through 
upstream functions to the coupling j RAMij = 1, if not, RAMij = 0. In case RAMij = 1, the element also will bring the 
so-called (in IT language) attribute. The attribute generally defines a property of the element, i.e. the relationships 
between two functions, based on the nature of the link (I, P, C, R and T). Figure 1 (A) shows an example of a simple 
FRAM model with 6 functions and 8 couplings. Figure 1 (B) shows the respective RAM, highlighting the elements 
that have a connection in a systematic and well-organized way. Note that in this example each output is defined as 
a number (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8), as detailed in Figure 1 (A).  
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 Figure 1. A conceptual example of RAM applied to FRAM. 
A connection between two or more couplings highlights a potential source of functional resonance in case the 
upstream coupling is subjected to a not-negligible internal or external variability. Therefore, the RAM allows 
discussing the effects of propagation of variability to downstream functions or its upstream origin, taking 
advantage of a systematic representation of the variability paths. 
For the purpose of an accident analysis, it would be of interest to investigate how a specific coupling affects the 
system (looking at its downstream couplings) or is affected by the system functioning, i.e. by the upstream 
couplings. For example, in case it would be necessary to look at how a relevant variability of the couplings j affects 
the system, there could be useful to follow this simple algorithm: 
A. pick the 𝑗-th coupling and mark the corresponding element in the heading row of the RAM 
B. assign 𝑖𝑘2 = 𝑗 and 𝑖𝑘1 = 1 
C. check if any element 𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑖𝑘1𝑖𝑘2 = 1 (for 𝑖𝑘2 = 𝑗 and 𝑖𝑘1 = 1 … , 𝑛) and mark them 
D. when condition at point C is verified, assign 𝑖𝑘2 = 𝑖𝑘1 and 𝑖𝑘1 = 1 
E. iterate step C until one of these two conditions is verified: there is no 𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑖𝑘1𝑖𝑘2 = 1; or if (𝑖𝑘2, 𝑖𝑘1) acquires 
yet assigned values (i.e. there is a closed loop). 
Figure 2 shows an example of the application of the algorithm to evaluate how the inherent variability of coupling 
7 affects other couplings in the model. It highlights respectively the following links: I-O (7 and 4), R-O (4 and 5), C-
O (5 and 8), P-O (8 and 6), I-O (6 and 8) and P-O (8 and 7), before verifying a stop condition, i.e. entering in a closed 
loop. Similar observations can be defined to understand the upstream sources of variability, simply adapting this 
reasoning. 
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 Figure 2. An analysis of downstream couplings in a conceptual RAM applied to FRAM. 
Furthermore, it is possible to take advantage of the attribute each RAMij = 1 is carrying (I, P, C, T, R). This attribute 
would guide the analysis through the path, to translate the FRAM hexagons into a logic representation of each 
connection. This analysis requires understanding the upstream-downstream coupling, looking in further detail at 
how differences in the quality of upstream output can affect the variability of downstream functions. For example, 
an upstream Output representing a Precondition of a downstream function, would be critical if too early, causing 
a potential false start, or even more critical if omitted, requiring improvisation, in both cases amplifying the effects 
of variability. Therefore, a medium level of variability of the Output may become high for the coupling under 
analysis (O-P).  The same Output, if is a Resource for a different downstream function, might have a less critical - 
even positive - effect on the coupling: the Output’ medium level in terms of variability may become a low level of 
variability for the coupling (O-R). Starting from the conceptual taxonomy of a generic socio-technical system, see 
Chapter 7 of Hollnagel’s book on FRAM 1, it is possible to describe each link by its own, using the combined 
knowledge of the SMEs involved in the analysis to understand if the Output’s variability is damped or amplified 
when connected to another aspect.  
Table 1 summarizes these observations by the SMEs involved in the analysis, showing how the inherent variability 
of an upstream Output may affect the interconnected functions: it amplifies, damps or has no effect, depending on 
the connection upstream/downstream connection. 
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Table 1. Upstream/Downstream propagation of variability 
 
In addition, there would be possible to develop a graphical representation of the couplings in the RAM, by a color-
coded variability scale (from red to green, see for example Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. A conceptual analysis of variability links in a RAM applied to a simple FRAM model. 
This assessment can be linked to Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory (NAT): the essence of accidents in complex 
systems is the interaction of multiple unavoidable failures that are not in a direct operation sequence. Perrow links 
the concept of system safety to the number of interconnections of an item 28. Consequently, it would be possible to 
create indexes based on the number of interconnections, as a means to identify highly connected couplings and 
then potential criticalities. This perspective reflects the idea that a coupling deriving from an upstream function, 
common to a group of couplings, might generate potential critical effects in the system, once that upstream output 
is released as variable. Based on RAM, we suggest two indexes, respectively considering the number of upstream 
links (UL) of a coupling and the downstream links (DL) of a 𝑗-th coupling: 𝑈𝐿𝑗 = ∑ 𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑗𝑤
𝑛
𝑤  and 𝐷𝐿𝑗 = ∑ 𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑤 . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 (I) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 1 (T) 0 0 0 0 1 (I) 0
5 0 0 1 (I) 1 (R) 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 (P)
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 (P)
8 0 0 0 0 1 (C) 1 (I) 0 0
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The higher the values of UL and DL and the more interconnected is the coupling (upstream or downstream), and 
consequently the higher the potential to propagate functional resonance within the system, leading to emergent 
events. These observations, which might appear trivial in this simplified model, would acquire a crucial role in 
more interconnected models, where a simple visual discussion would not allow a complete and systematic 
analysis. 
3.4 Step 4: Management of variability 
The purpose of this step consists of understanding the complexity of the work domain. At this step, the simplest 
analysis consists of looking if there is any simple cause-effect link due to the excess of variability of specific 
functions, even arising as a combination of multiple sources of variability. Furthermore, the FRAM especially with 
the aid of RAM, acknowledges the dynamic non-linear essence of couplings, and focuses on finding the tight 
couplings and complex interactions that can explain the event. The final step of the investigation process is linked 
not only to the definition of barriers and to the detection of latent conditions. It also looks at how performance 
variability can be monitored and managed, specifically looking at how variability can be managed with no negative 
effects on system productivity, i.e. acknowledging that a portion of variability in everyday work in unavoidable to 
ensure both safety, productivity and quality. Therefore, a FRAM model might provide guidelines for defining 
performance indexes to monitor system’s variability, because of a RAM-based systematic assessment.  
4. Illustrative case study 
On a world base, the majority of accidents involving Air Traffic Management (ATM) occurred during the ground 
phase of flight 29. One of the most important safety events in the ground phase is the so-called runway incursion 
(RI-VAP), defined by ICAO as “any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, 
or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft” 30. A RI-VAP can be 
categorized using different grade of severity, ranging from D to A, where the most severe ones (grade A - B) include 
a near collision and a collision. ATCOs have a crucial role for preventing potential RI-VAP, which usually represents 
an emergent event rather than a simple cause-effect relationship. On this path, to deal with RI-VAP, it becomes 
necessary to be proactive rather than reactive to manage variability’s propagation, when necessary. It becomes 
necessary thus to act in terms of Safety-II, looking at system functioning and at the inter-relations among the 
system’s agents rather than the single probability of failure. In terms of communications among pilot and ATCOs, 
(e.g.) a failure can be a misunderstanding: a disagreement, a difference of opinion, or more specifically a failure to 
understand or interpret correctly someone or something 30,31.  
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This section describes the development of a FRAM model to analyse in-depth the system functioning, in a scenario 
leading to a runway incursion in LAX airport (1991). The model would allow the analysis of functions performed 
by ATCOs, in charge of responsibility for moving the aircraft from the apron to the holding point of the assigned 
runway, by pilots and by airport personnel, working for the ground-handling provider, in charge of inspect the 
runway. Each agent is also discussed looking at the organizational aspects related to his actions. The analysis is 
focused on the departure of an aircraft, on how the required functions to realize the operations in a well safe, 
efficient, effective and operational scenario, interact with each other.  
Note that this illustrative case study does not aim to develop a new complete accident analysis, but rather to show 
the potential of FRAM and RAM, in a complex work domain. 
4.1 Description of the event 
On January, 1st 1991, ATC system at LAX (Los Angeles International airport) was classified as level V (the one 
allowing the maximum number of movements at that time) 32. This classification was used to define an ATC tower 
able to manage more than 100 movements per hour, 16 hours per day, with 632.312 total movements in 1990. 
The accident happened one hour after the sunset. In the tower, there were 13 ATCOs. The Local Controller 2 (LC2) 
was the ATCO in charge of the RWY 24L, when the event occurred. LC2 used frequency 133.900 MHz and was 
engaged in a routinely work shift: during night, with many aircrafts landing and departing every 50 seconds, using 
2 RWYs at the same time for both landing and departing activity, with a consequently complex taxiway net. 
Frequency was extremely busy, due to the numerous communications from and for pilots. With two aircraft at the 
holding point of RWY 24L, with others 15 engaging the frequency, flight SKW5569 (SkyWest), taxing on the 
maneuvering area, asked to depart from intermediate intersection 45. The LC2 did authorize the intermediate line 
up, while busy in re-establishing communications with WW5006 (West Wings), which was authorized to cross 
RWY 24L, close to the end of runway. There were numerous communications with that aircraft, since it 
erroneously changed frequency. At the same time, the approaching flight USair 1493, after not being able to 
established radio communications with the TWR, reiterate its presence at 18:04:35, by then at the very short final. 
Having already done all the controls only missed the landing clearance. Among the first radio contact of USair1493 
and its second communication, in 1 minute and 30 seconds, the LC2 gave and received 40 communications. Into 
this temporal interval, SKW5569 asked for lining up using intermediate intersection 45. The LC2 gave the 
authorization while USair1493 was approaching the threshold 24: it was authorized to land at 18:05:51. Among 
the second communication of USair1493 and its landing clearance, the LC2 gave and received 22 others calls. In 
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the meantime, SKW5569 have been waiting on the RWY 24L for 2 minutes and 17 seconds. The impact occurred 
at 18:06:59, as deducted from VCR of the USAir1493. 
The NTSB’s conclusion defines the LC2’s role in the event as a metaphoric iceberg’s peak, whose mass was, as a 
whole, the actual messy reality behind the event. Therefore, in a complex socio-technical system, the analysis of 
action has to be contextualized in the specific operational situation itself, in order to understand the local 
rationality of the specific event. This local rationality plays a crucial role to understand the ATCO’s actions and 
behaviours. Considering his/her role as a sharp end operator, his/her actions relies on all the operators’ working 
actions and operating conditions. This central role becomes evident in the event of USair1493 accident, requiring 
a systemic perspective to allow a reliable accident analysis. FRAM would help performing this analysis, as detailed 
in the next steps. 
4.2 FRAM Step 1 for the USAir 1943 accident  
Starting from the NTSB report, testimonies by people involved in the event, documents and coeval accounts, and 
moreover based on three SMEs’ analysis of the event, the FRAM model discussed in this paper counts 57 functions 
(organizational, technological and human) interconnected with each other by n = 245 couplings. Since some of 
these functions can be considered as collectors of performance variability, it would be even possible to develop a 
more detailed model, to address specific features of the accident. These numbers based on a real scenario reflects 
a complicated model. Table 2 lists the functions involved in the analysis, detailing the agent performing them. 
Table 2. List of functions of the FRAM model 
Function Agent 
Give a take-off Clearance ATCO 
Taxi Pilot  
Give a taxi clearance ATCO 
Request a taxi clearance Pilot 
Take weather and airport data (Notams) Pilot 
Make a taxi briefing Pilot  
Perform a taxi checklist Pilot 
Request clearance(s) from ATC Pilot 
Take off briefing Pilot 
Perform a before take-off checklist Pilot  
Request a clearance for take off Pilot 
Line up on the runway Pilot 
Prepare flight info (by flight dispatcher) Organization/Pilot 
Give weather and airport data ATCO 
Request start up and push back Pilot  
Give clearance for start-up and push back ATCO 
Observe weather phenomena Organization/ATCO 
Coordinate with APP Organization/ATCO  
Coordinate with ACC Organization/ATCO 
Meteo data Technology/ATCO 
Organise operations strategically Organization/ATCO 
Check inbound-outbound list ATCO 
Experience Organization/ATCO  
Assess A/C position from working position ATCO  
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Ambient working condition Organization/ATCO 
Cockpit working condition Organization/Pilot 
TFM Organization/ATCO 
HMI Organization/ATCO  
Give ATC clearance ATCO 
Be operative ATCO 
Engage the RWY Pilot 
FMS Technology/Pilot 
Manage the FMS Pilot 
Handler Organization/Airport facility 
Readback ATCO 
Hearback ATCO 
Sterile cockpit Organization /Pilot 
SGS working Technology/ATCO 
ASDE working Technology/ATCO 
Follow the surface markings Pilot  
Entry procedures complied ATCO 
TWYs system Organization/ATCO 
Give an intermediate line up clearance ATCO  
Request clearance for intermediate take off Pilot   
Organise operations tactically Organization/ATCO  
Manage flight strips ATCO  
Monitor frequency Pilot 
Communication style ATCO 
Radio apparatus working Technology/ATCO  
BRITE working Technology/ATCO 
Evaluate ATC features Organization/ATCO  
Radio communication phraseology and techniques Organization/ATCO 
Manage air traffic volume Organization/ATCO 
Coordinate movements ATCO 
Request landing clearance Pilot 
Give landing clearance ATCO 
Maintain RWY holding point Pilot  
4.3 FRAM Step 2 for the USAir 1943 accident 
Firstly, functions have been characterized individually, describing all the necessary aspects and phenotypes of 
their actual variability during the event, which has been described by the SMEs involved in the analysis, following 
Hollnagel’s simple solution, i.e. in terms of timing and precision 1. Subsequently, the origin of the variability was 
identified for all the Outputs, as the result of both internal and external variability, besides upstream-downstream 
couplings. The SMEs assign also a rank to variability for each functions, based on their experience on the field with 
the knowledge obtained about the specific event, by a simple color-coded scale on three values (see Table 3):  
- Red, function’s timing and precision have a serious effect on how downstream functions are performed 
- Yellow, function’s timing and precision have a potential effect on how downstream functions are 
performed 
- Green, functions’ timing and precision have a limited or even negligible effect on the system, with no 
consequences on how downstream functions are performed. 
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Table 3. Variability values for each function and criticality scale 
Function Timing Precision Criticality 
Give a take-off Clearance Not at all Imprecise  
Taxi Too late Imprecise  
Give a taxi clearance On time Precise  
Request a taxi clearance On time Precise  
Take weather and airport data (Notams) On time Precise  
Make a taxi briefing On time Imprecise  
Perform a taxi checklist On time Precise  
Request clearance(s) from ATC On time Precise  
Take off briefing On time Imprecise  
Perform a before take-off checklist Too early Precise  
Request a clearance for take off On time Precise  
Line up on the runway On time Imprecise  
Prepare flight info (by flight dispatcher) On time Precise  
Give weather and airport data On time Precise  
Request start up and push back On time  Precise  
Give clearance for start-up and push back On time Imprecise  
Observe weather phenomena On time  Precise  
Coordinate with APP On time  Acceptable   
Coordinate with ACC On time Precise  
Meteo data On time Precise  
Organise operations strategically Not at all Imprecise  
Check inbound-outbound list On time Precise  
Experience Not at all Imprecise  
Assess A/C position from working position Not at all Imprecise  
Ambient working condition Not at all Imprecise  
Cockpit working condition On time Precise  
TFM On time  Precise   
HMI Not at all Imprecise  
Give ATC clearance On time Precise  
Be operative On time  Precise  
Engage the RWY Too early Imprecise  
FMS On time Precise  
Manage the FMS On time Precise  
Handler On time Precise  
Readback  Not at all Imprecise  
Hearback Not at all Imprecise  
Steryle cockpit On time Precise   
SGS working On time Precise   
ASDE working Not at all Imprecise  
Follow the surface markings On time Precise   
Entry procedures Too early Imprecise   
TWYs system working On time Precise   
Give an intermediate line up clearance Too early Imprecise  
Request clearance for intermediate take off On time Imprecise  
Organise operations tactically Not at all Imprecise  
Manage flight strips Not at al Imprecise  
Monitor frequency Not at all Imprecise  
Communication style On time Imprecise  
Radio apparatus working On time Precise  
BRITE working On time Imprecise  
Evaluate ATC features On time Imprecise  
Radio communication phraseology and techniques Too late Imprecise  
Manage air traffic volume Not at all Imprecise  
Coordinate movements Not at all Imprecise  
Request landing clearance On time Acceptable  
Give landing clearance Too early Imprecise  
Maintain RWY holding point On time Precise  
4.4 FRAM Step 3 for the USAir 1943 accident 
Once identified the variability of each function, it is necessary to evaluate each coupling with other functions. 
Figure 4 depicts the overall FRAM model, which offers an overview of the inherent complexity of the process, and 
the subsequent inherent issues related to its analysis. In this case, as well as in many practical application of the 
method, the traditional analysis based on the visual representation of the model might offers limited help. For this 
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purpose, the RAM would help highlighting all the couplings relations, and thus helping identifying those potential 
paths where the functional resonance might propagate. Figure 5 depicts the color-coded RAM, based on the 
assessment included in Table 3 and the SMEs’ critical observation to define the effects of variability in downstream 
and upstream couplings, based on the nature of the link and of the function (see Chapter 7 of Hollnagel’s FRAM 
book 1). Figure 6 shows the complete RAM, where the elements RAMij = 1 are characterized by a blue background 
color. Figure 6 shows also each one of the 245 couplings, in terms of its UL and DL, coding their value in a color-
coded scale respectively in the last column (UL) and row (DL). The scale (green, yellow, red) is directly 
proportional to UL and DL values, whose range in this case are respectively (0, 24) and (0, 21). For more details, 
Figure 7 details the occurrences of couplings in the same color-coded scale, specifying the focus on initial analysis, 
as discussed in §4.5. At this step, analyzing in detail the work-as-done through the RAM, it is possible to understand 
how the functional resonance propagated throughout the system, applying and iterating the procedure described 
in §3.3. 
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 Figure 4. The complete FRAM model for the USair1943 accident. 
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Figure 5. The color-coded RAM based on the FRAM model for the USair1943 accident.  
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 Figure 6. The complete FRAM model for the USair1943 accident, showing UL and DL for each coupling.
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 Figure 7. Formal representation of DL (as emerged from the RAM) and focus of initial analysis on the highest 
values of DL 
4.5 FRAM Step 4 for the USAir 1943 accident 
Lastly, for the purpose of step 4, once extrapolated the downstream and upstream couplings, it is necessary 
to focus on how non-linear interactions might affect the system variability, by the aid of the RAM, rather 
than the FRAM visual model. For example, we use the RAM to focus on the downstream and upstream 
couplings of functions characterized by a potentially serious variability in the scenario, i.e. <Readback> and 
<Hearback> (both “Not at all” and “Imprecise”, see Table 3), and their relationships with an organizational 
function, i.e. <Organize operations tactically> which also is critical in terms of variability (“Not at all” and 
“imprecise”, see Table 3). Conceptually, the FRAM analysis about <Readback> and similarly <Hearback>, 
confirms that these functions act as intermediary between the organizational functions and the operational 
ones. However, it is difficult to identify and represent this correlation by traditional Safety-I reasoning and 
methods. Traditional analyses generally focus at each one of these levels, developing independent safety 
assessments (or dependent via direct and static causal correlations).  
More in detail, the couplings <National OPS applied-Readback> (coupling number 170) <National OPS 
applied-Hearback> (coupling number 172) are two of the most critical couplings in terms of downstream 
links (DL=17) with limited upstream influences (UL=4). Furthermore, they are extremely critical if 
considering the effects of <National OPS applied>, i.e. OPS actually not applied, acts as Input for both of 
them. In this case, both functions <Readback> and <Hearback> would not be carried out properly, 
amplifying the variability of the upstream Output generating potential loss of time, loss of accuracy and 
misunderstandings. 
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Therefore, these observation lead to focus primarily on the downstream effects of their variability, and 
secondarily on the upstream couplings. Adopting the algorithm described in §3.3 and using the color-coded 
matrix shown in Figure 6, it would be possible to highlight those couplings with critical effects on the 
systems (red, or yellow in Table 3). An example of iteration of the downstream and upstream iteration of 
the algorithm, would allow relating functions at different abstraction levels (tactical, operational), as shown 
in Figure 8. Note that the sinusoids in the hexagons indicate the functions characterized by a not negligible 
criticality in terms of variability (red, or yellow in Table 3). 
 
Figure 8. Example connections for <Readback> and <Hearback> with not-negligilble effect on the system (red 
or yellow couplings). 
Furthermore, it is possible to use the RAM again, in order to identify completely the systemic effects, in 
terms of upstream and downstream couplings, significant in terms of variability, still adopting the color-
coded algorithm in Figure 5. More in detail, (e.g.) about <Readback>, we started listening the radio 
communications related to the event, in order to define in detail how the variability propagates. We 
observed that <Readback> hardly ever respects those performance limits established at the organizational 
level. Moreover, <Readback> being a human function, is inherently variable, and its variability allows the 
functioning of the system by the ATCOs who monitor continuously performance and take actions following 
expected or unexpected events.  
On this context, it is relevant to look at the Airman’s Information Manual (Chapter 2, section 4. Radio 
communication and phraseology and techniques –the edition in force-) which stated: Brevity is important, 
and contacts should be kept as brief as possible, but the controller must know exactly what you can do before 
he can properly carry out his control duties. And you, the pilot, must know exactly what he wants you. 
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The Manual acknowledged brevity as crucial and demanded for contacts as short as possible: this reasoning 
implies the ATCO to be prepared, knowing exactly what to do before and during its work activities, and the 
pilot to be prepared to answer promptly the ATCO’s requests. This aleatory statement might be properly 
identified and assessed, only when its variability is calculated and reported (e.g. in terms of timing and 
precision), reactively looking at the past events, or proactively to define safety measures. 
For example, Figure 9 clarifies how <Readback> supervises, as Control, the acceptability of most functions. 
It intervenes repeatedly, so that it represents a reference point from which an excess of performance 
variability can accumulate (because of its redundancy) and propagate through the operational scenario: 
note for example the two links with <Request clearance for intermediate take off>, i.e. the two close 
communications at 18:03:38 and 18:03:44 (see Figure 9). The coupling between <Readback> and <Request 
clearance for intermediate take off> has a strong impact within the system (DL=21) and thus it has to be 
managed properly in terms of upstream variability, i.e. <Readback>. In the meantime, just to confirm the 
repetitiveness of <Readback>, note the link with <Give an intermediate line up clearance> at 18.03.40 (see 
Figure 9). This analysis confirms the crucial role of <Readback> function, to be considered as a potential 
source of amplification for the variability even among different agents, i.e. ATCO (blue hexagons) and pilot 
(yellow hexagons). 
 
Figure 9. The most relevant (red or yellow couplings in terms of criticality) systemic effects of <Readback> in 
the USair 1943 accident. 
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Another example of the relevance of the benefits of RAM would lead to track the couplings of a critically 
positioned function, i.e. <Manage flight strips>. Figure 10 shows the functional interdependencies among 
organizational functions at the blunt-end (the purple hexagons: <Organise operations tactically> and 
<Organise operations strategically>), and operational functions at the sharp-end (the blue hexagons: <Give 
clearance for start-up and push back>, <Give a taxi clearance>, <Give an intermediate line up clearance>, 
<Give a take-off clearance>, <Give landing clearance>). In particular, during the event, the Output of 
<Manage flight strips>, i.e. <Strip marking> worked as a communication channel, transporting an excess of 
variability, which played a relevant role for the emergence of the event itself, even considering that there 
were no chance to interrupt its excess of variability (see the five C-O connections of <Strip marking> in 
Figure 10). After SKW5569 was authorized to line up on the runway and before USair1493 was authorised 
to land, the LC2 became aware of the lack of a flight progress strip. This flight progress strip was related to 
another aircraft, i.e. WW5072 next to ask for taking off. The LC2 did not have the flight progress strip for 
the fact that people at LAX operated in constancy of an incongruence between the function <Organise 
operations strategically> and the function <Organise operations tactically>, which directly controls the 
ATCO’s function (see Figure 10).  
More in detail, by June 1988, the National Legislation for Strategic Planning did provide that the Ground 
Controller (GC) prepares […] reviews [...] revises [...] marks [...] forwards the flight progress strip to the 
appropriate (control) position. On the contrary, at the tactical and operational level it was published by 
January 11th 1990, the Supplement 1 to National order 7220.2°. This amendment stated that the strip (has 
to) be forwarded to the appropriate local control position, but also that there is no strip marking required of 
ground control. Strip management was considered a coordination item between the Delivery Controller 
(DC) and LC2 while, at the same time, the aircraft management representing the physical counterpart of 
flight progress strip, was related to DC, GC and LC2. 
International Journal of Reliability, Quality and Safety Engineering 
Patriarca Riccardo, Del Pinto Gianluca, Di Gravio Giulio, and Costantino Francesco 
https://doi.org/10.1142/S0218539318500018
 Figure 10. The relevant (red or yellow couplings in terms of criticality) systemic effects of <Manage flight 
strips> in the USair 1943 accident and respective upstream relevant functions. 
In this case, the strategic organizational function was not able to dampen the variability for a different 
intention of the tactical organization function. Consequently, the operational interpretation by blunt-end 
operators was misled by middle management (at tactical level) that, in turn, misled the sharp-end 
operators, in terms of their local rationality. Middle management intended to decrease the GC’s workload, 
not considering the side effects in terms of LC2’s increased workload. The analysis also shows how <Strip 
management>, which is fundamentally an individual function, has strong systemic implications, seriously 
affecting the system (DL=12) in the operational scenario. 
By similar observations, it is then possible to understand the local rationality -rather than finding a unique 
root cause- of the accident and even develop a proactive safety assessment to properly manage variability. 
For example, the function <Give a take-off clearance> were a source of variability because in the work-as-
done its output were “Imprecise” and “Not in time” (see Figure 8). Subsequently, since the aircrafts were 
not receiving authorization for take-off, workload for ATCO and pilots progressively increased, causing an 
abnormal disruptive flow of variability. Consequently, for properly manage this variability in other events, 
it would be necessary assess more accurately the priority to assign for take-off clearance in order to avoid 
extra workload due to a congested RWY. Rather than a simple sharp-end barrier, the proactive safety 
analysis should focus on organizational effects, even considering other aspects to re-iterate the process.  
It could be interesting to observe that 6 weeks before the event, the function <Give a take-off clearance> 
was evaluated as part of a comprehensive and periodical assessment, identifying deficiencies that were 
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indicative of weaknesses 32. However, the decision maker failed to dispose an effective action for managing 
system’s variability, lacking of a holistic depiction of the operational scenario, and thus ignoring the 
systemic effects of a potential disruptive variability. On this path, FRAM by systematic assessments offered 
by RAM would support this type of observations. 
 
5. Conclusions 
FRAM allows systemic retrospective (event investigation) and prospective safety analyses (risk 
assessment).  FRAM is one of the methods based on Safety-II and Resilience Engineering, which take into 
account nowadays systems’ complexity.  
 
About other approaches 
FRAM’s functional perspective overcomes the traditional causality credo, which is strongly rooted in 
traditional safety analysis method. For example, the Root Cause Analysis (RCA), relying on the Domino 
model explains events as developing following a chain reaction of causes and effects where the first domino 
piece that falls represents the root cause while the last domino piece represents the final outcome or injury 
1. Similar reflections emerge when analysing Rasmussen’s Accimap, a method to identify causal factors at 
different management levels that aims to identify the causal relation among events by linking physical 
sequence of events and activities at governmental, regulatory, and societal levels 1. A case study in an 
offshore operation’s accident modelling proves the relevance of FRAM with respect to Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) to detect non-linear interactions of various functions, especially in case of complex and vast systems. 
FRAM is powerful since modelling everyday work does not require operational data of failure, which are 
rare in high-reliability systems 19. 
When compared to traditional Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), FRAM has been assessed to be 
useful as well. Firstly, it forces consideration of the different contextual aspects that are usually not 
included in the simple sequential process maps used as a basis for the application of FMEA itself. Secondly, 
it is advocated to be more intuitive than FMEA, since it does not require consideration of failures and 
absolute consequences but qualitative assessment of variability, judgments which practitioners perceive 
more comfortably 9. FRAM can be considered advantageous even with respect to Hazard and Operability 
Analysis (HAZOP), since FRAM does not require isolating attributes or information flows, with the inherent 
potential to mask more complex problems that arise only when multiple attributes or flows interact in 
complex ways 33. 
International Journal of Reliability, Quality and Safety Engineering 
Patriarca Riccardo, Del Pinto Gianluca, Di Gravio Giulio, and Costantino Francesco 
https://doi.org/10.1142/S0218539318500018
As a general observation, the effectiveness of applying FRAM is related to the characteristics of the system 
under investigation. If the event concerns the operations of a components or a sequence of components, 
the investigation can be developed using traditional analysis based on cause-effect structural reasoning 
(RCA, FTA, FMECA, etc.). Otherwise, if the event takes into account both human and organizational aspects 
in a broader perspective, it is necessary to acknowledge inherent complexity of the system, using a systemic 
perspective based on functional approaches. More generally, the advantages of using a combined Safety-
I/Safety-II approach has been strongly emphasized for gaining holistic analysis of complex and complicated 
systems, requiring both a technological and a system-wide focus 34,35.  
About the outcome of the method  
Starting from the positive case studies obtained applying FRAM for systemic accident analysis, this paper 
explores the possibility of enhancing FRAM’s classical formulation in order to generate assessments that 
are more systematic. As observed in literature 27, the graphical representation of a FRAM model in case of 
a complex process may become quickly highly interconnected and thus overwhelming to interpret.  This 
paper, discussing a simple and user-friendly tool, i.e. the RAM, shows the benefits arising from a matrix of 
functional resonance. RAM allows understanding, in a structured way, the effects of variability and its 
propagation both upstream and downstream in the system. This approach might lead to identifying critical 
sources of functional resonance, and thus ways to manage in terms of system’s resilience.  
RAM is not supposed to be a standalone tool, but it has to be used as a support tool for developing a FRAM 
model and the standard graphical representation. The illustrative case study based on the LAX accident 
happened in 1991, details the practical application steps, detailing how a FRAM analysis might guide the 
observation of an event, linking different process and different actors in a functional perspective.  
About future research 
FRAM and RAM could be combined with the model-aided checker to visualize all the actual paths of a FRAM 
model, as discussed by 26. Furthermore, RAM perfectly fits with a recent evolution of FRAM addressing a 
semi-quantitative structure based on Monte Carlo simulation 23. In this case, it would be possible to define 
distributions for variability of functions based on SMEs’ judgments, historic data, or even observational 
studies, and then explore the upstream and downstream couplings by a computational algorithm based on 
the RAM conceptual idea. 
On this path, the purpose of the model would consists of creating functional hot spots. In aviation, physical 
hot spots already exist in those airports where the complexity exceeds the possibility to have a holistic 
situational awareness. In these scenarios, ATCOs, pilots and ground personnel need to know specific 
physical positions (called hot spots) where it is more common, more possible, that a runway incursion 
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might occur. Therefore, RAM would help answering some questions: Is it be possible to identify functions 
that represent an abstract hot spot, along the lines of the physical ones? Is it possible to detect a recurring 
critical coupling, between two or more functions with critical systemic consequences? Is there any “black 
swan” that can emerge because of systemic variability? The RAM might offer a valuable contribution 
answering these questions, systematically exploring the potential relationships in a FRAM model. 
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